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IT'S WHAT'S FOR LUNCH: NECTARINES,
MUSHROOMS, AND BEEF-THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND COMPELLED
COMMERCIAL SPEECH*
Kathleen M. Sullivan & Robert C. Postt
JAMES WEINSTEIN: Time for dessert, intellectual dessert. It's my
great pleasure to introduce and moderate a discussion between two of
the nation's most distinguished law professors: Kathleen Sullivan
and Robert Post. Any introduction that would do justice to their
accomplishments would take up far too much of the short time
allotted. So, by way of a very summary and incomplete introduction,
Kathleen Sullivan is the Stanley Morrison Professor of Law at
Stanford Law School where she served as dean from 1999 to 2004.
She is the author of numerous works on various aspects of
constitutional law, including, with the late Gerald Gunther, co-author
of the leading constitutional case book.' Robert Post is the David
Boies Professor of Law at Yale Law School and also the author of
numerous works on constitutional law, including Constitutional
Domains, an extremely influential book on free speech. Despite
their wide-ranging interests and accomplishments in other areas of
constitutional law, I think it's fair to say that they both have written
most extensively on and have a special interest in free speech. Both
have written important articles on commercial speech, including, as
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it turns out, in The Supreme Court Review. 3 And, Robert Post's
recent article in that publication is on the subject of today's
presentation, compelled commercial speech.
So, here's the menu for today's lunchtime entertainment.
Kathleen will give a short description of the relevant cases: Robert
will then give an analysis of these decisions, followed by a
commentary by Kathleen. Then after a response by Robert we will
have, time permitting, a more free flowing discussion between the
two. As for the ground rules, I insist on only one thing: under no
circumstances are there to be any more pathetic food puns. I think
I've already milked that half-baked idea for about all it's worth. We
will now hear from Kathleen.
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN: I don't know. I thought we would try to
combine the three cases into tournedos-Rossini-flamb&. Well, we
turn now to the all-important question of the First Amendment right
not to be forced to say: "Got milk?"; "Beef, it's what's for dinner";
[and] "Pork, the other white meat." There's a host of these cases
about compelled exactions to support generic food product
advertising campaigns. They've percolated along in the lower
courts. We'll talk about three Supreme Court cases: the stone fruit
case involving nectarines, plums and peaches, Glickman v. Wileman
Bros. & Elliott, Inc.;5 the mushrooms case, United States v. United
Foods;6 and the beef case, Johanns v. Livestock Marketing
Association.7  But, in the lower courts, there are lots of other
products that have been at stake, including crocodile skins,8 a case
that could be entitled, "You, You're What's for Dinner."
3. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The Implications of
44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123; Robert C. Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech:
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n., 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 195 [hereinafter Post, Compelled
Subsidization]; see also Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA
L. REv. 1, 25 (2000)
4. Post, Compelled Subsidization, supra note 3; see also Robert Post, Transparent and
Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech and Coerced Commercial Association in
United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REv. 555 (2006).
5. 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
6. 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
7. 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
8. See United States v. Shaffett, 95 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1120
(1997).
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Turning to this question, I just want to go back and revisit some
First Amendment first principles. The Court has established that,
just as there's a right to speak, there's a right not to speak. So, we
have a line of cases invalidating speech compulsions, including the
right not to have to salute the flag in a classroom upheld in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette;9 not to have to
become a mobile billboard for the state's politically contestable
slogan, "Live Free or Die," in the New Hampshire license plate
case, Wooley v. Maynard;'0 or, not to have to include in a St.
Patrick's Day Parade an overt contingent proclaiming that it's the
gay and lesbian Irish contingent of Boston in Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston." In the
Hurley case, Justice Souter, writing for the Court, said that it's not
sufficient that the parade might seek to disclaim the gay contingent-
you can't exactly stop every few blocks in the parade, stop singing
Danny Boy and say, "We disavow the gay contingent"--and Justice
Souter also said, "We're not quite sure what the St. Patrick's Parade
is trying to say, but we didn't know what Lewis Carroll's poem
Jabberwocky meant, we didn't know what Jackson Pollock or Arnold
Schoenberg meant with their art or music."' 2 So, it doesn't matter if
we know exactly what Wacko Hurley and the boys are saying. What
we do know is they have the right to exclude unwanted speech from
their parade.
So, we can think of Barnette, Wooley and Hurley as involving
an unadulterated right not to speak and not to have speech forced
upon one where one will be associated with that speech, as in the gay
contingent in the St. Patrick's Day Parade. The First Amendment
right not to speak is extended to a right not to sponsor speech, not to
become a platform for the speech of third parties which you believe
will be associated with you and with which you disagree.
By the way, the disagreement doesn't have to be ideological in
these cases. That was the point of the Lewis Carroll, Jackson
Pollock, Arnold Schoenberg comparison that Justice Souter made in
Hurley.3 He wasn't insisting that you want to not speak or not
9. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
10. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
11. 515 U.S. 557(1995).
12. Id. at 569.
13. Id.
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sponsor speech because you disagree with it. 14 You simply don't
want to speak at all through the vehicle that's being thrust on you."'
The right not to sponsor speech comes up in cases like PG&E v.
Public Utilities Commission,6 which says that a publicly regulated
utility does not have to include in its billing envelope, even if there's
space that doesn't require an increase in the postage required, the
speech of anti-electricity consumption groups like TURN 7 that want
to occupy and co-speak in the space.
Now, the Court has rejected extensions of PG&E in cases where
it reasons that the corporate speaker will not be associated with the
speech. The PruneYard Shopping Center will not be associated with
the speech of anti-Zionist leaflet distributors outside the shoe store
because everyone will think PruneYard is about shoes, not leaflets
and no one will attribute the speech to the owner. 8 Similarly, in
Turner Broadcasting v. F. C. C.,9 the Court rejected a claim that cable
operators were being compelled to speak in violation of the Barnette
principle when they had to carry broadcast signals they would prefer
not to carry. The Court reasoned that there was no troubling
compelled speech there."0 This was a content-neutral, industry-
specific antitrust regulation regulating a choke hold monopoly by
cable, not an infliction of compelled speech in the sense of Barnette,
Wooley, Hurley or PG&E.
So, we know there's a line of cases about not having to speak
against one's will or to sponsor speech against one's will. There's a
second line of cases about not having to be associated with members
of an organization with whom you would rather not associate as an
extension of the speech principle. Boy Scouts do not have to include
an avowedly gay scoutmaster if their creed means straight Boy
Scouts, in effect." Chief Justice Rehnquist essentially was saying, if
you want to have Gay Boy Scouts, go have Gay Boy Scouts and you
14. Id.
15. Id. at 573-74.
16. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
17. Toward Utility Rate Normalization ("TURN").
18. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
19. 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
20. Id. at 213-14.
21. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000).
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can have a gay scoutmaster in the Gay Boy Scouts. 22 And I must say
that if we had Gay Boy Scouts, we'd surely have a much more
fashionable uniform.
Just as the compelled speech line of cases has its limits where
the sponsored speech will not be attributed to the objecting speaker,
so too the compelled association line of cases has its limits when the
allegedly offending association isn't really contrary to the speaker's
speech. The Jaycees and the Rotary Club aren't allowed to exclude
women because they're not the male supremacist society, and there's
nothing incompatible with women's membership in the Jaycees, as
there might be in the Boy Scouts.
Now, you extract from these two lines of cases the line of cases
we'll talk about today: a First Amendment claim against the
compelled exaction of financial payments to subsidize speech one
would prefer not to subsidize with respect to generic agricultural
marketing schemes. Such schemes exact funds for advertising all
beef to increase demand for beef; advertising all pork to increase
demand for pork; advertising all stone fruits to increase demand for
all stone fruits; advertising mushrooms generically to increase
demand for mushrooms. And the objecting speakers in these cases
say, "But I don't think my plum is just like your plum. I think my
plum is better than your plum. It's organic, it's small, it's hybrid. It
doesn't cause illness if eaten when green." Or, "I don't think my
mushrooms are the same as your mushrooms. My beef, grass fed on
organic grass, and not subjected to cruel and unusual slaughtering
procedures, is different from your beef."
So, individual commercial dissenters want to say, so to speak,
that being compelled to support generic advertising schemes
infringes their right of disassociation or their right of silence, the
right not to have to support speech with which they disagree. They
rely, of course, on another line of cases: the Aboodl3 line of cases.
This line of cases says that having to pay for speech is just like
having to speak, and if you have to pay for speech through a
government exaction that is used for purposes that are not germane
to the reason we exacted the money-it's being used for something
22. Cf id. at 655-56 (holding that the Boy Scouts as an "expressive association" has a First
Amendment right to protect the expressive message of its choice).
23. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36, 240 (1977).
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else-you have a conscientious objector's right to have a pro rata
refund of your funds to the extent they are going to the non-germane
purpose.
Now, what does all that translate into? If I am required to pay
dues to a union because I work for a union shop or governmental
agency, I may have to pay dues to the union so it can engage in
collective bargaining activities. But I get a refund to the extent that
the union is campaigning on a referendum issue, supporting a
political party, or engaging in speech activities unrelated to collective
bargaining with which I disagree. If I'm in an integrated bar state-
this is the Keller4 case-I may have to pay dues to the integrated bar
in order to protect against violations of attorney disciplinary rules,
pay into an escrow fund to support repayment to victims of
malpractice and so forth. I may have to pay into the bar to the extent
it is promoting the administration of justice and preserving the
interests of the organized bar, but I'm not required to pay into the bar
association to the extent it's speaking out on other controversial
issues-the correctness of the war, the rightness of Roe v. Wade,25
and so forth. I get a pro rata refund. Just as there's a PruneYard-
Turner limit to the PG&E line of cases, just as there's a Jaycees limit
to the Boy Scouts case, there is also a limit to this line of cases.
Sometimes when we're forced to pay into an organization where
we can't really disaggregate the germane from the non-germane
purposes, we do have to pay. This is Board of Regents of University
of Wisconsin System v. Southworth,26 in which the Court says we
can't imagine how in a university you can segregate the ideas that are
at the center of the university's mission from the student organization
activities that are at the periphery. We decline to go into this and so
we just say that as to exactions from Christian students who don't
want to support Planned Parenthood activities or vice versa, Planned
Parenthood supporters who don't want to support the Christian
organizations, you don't have an Abood right to dissent from student
organization fees, period. So, there's a limit to all these cases. And
we might say that in the compelled exaction cases the ultimate limit
is that we don't have an Abood right not to pay our taxes, no matter
24. Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1990).
25. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
26. 529 U.S. 217, 231 (2000).
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how much every April 15th, we think of all the things we dissent
from that those taxes are going to, whether it's inappropriate
agricultural marketing schemes or the war in Iraq. The ultimate limit
on the Abood line of cases is that nobody thinks you have a First
Amendment right not to pay your taxes. That's the general
background
Let's go now to the stone fruit, mushrooms and beef decisions. 7
This is a trilogy of cases that I think nobody will disagree
exemplifies the kind of doctrinal instability and incoherence that
Bruce [Johnson] was referring to on the panel when he described
them. Just to recap the bidding on these: Glickman upholds against
First Amendment challenge the compulsion of fee payments from
stone fruit growers into the agricultural marketing scheme for stone
fruits, reasoning that, first, there was no violation of conscience
involved. 8 It wasn't like you're against plums. If you're a plum
grower, you're for plums. It's not like being made to worship a
graven image or to do something that is against your principles.
You're a plum person, but you just think your plums are better. So,
there's no ideological self-contradiction in making you pay into the
generic scheme just because you would prefer to have an
individualized scheme that promotes your plums against others.
Second, the majority says that the exaction is germane to the
larger content-neutral purpose of running a Stalinist command-and-
control collective agricultural scheme.29 You might debate the
wisdom of having a Stalinist agricultural scheme, but if you have
one, compelled exactions for advertising are simply part and parcel
of other collective obligations that the growers have to pool their
2resources. Therefore, this is more like paying your bar dues to the
bar to work for protecting clients against lawyer malpractice; it's
more like paying your dues to the labor union in order to engage in
collective bargaining. It's not like having to pay the organization to
do something that's non-germane to its original reason for existing,
and therefore it's permissible. That's an opinion by Justice Stevens,
joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg and Breyer, saying
essentially we'll relegate this out of the First Amendment, it gets
27. Glickman v. Weilman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997); United States v. United
Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
28. Glickman, 521 U.S. at 472.
29. Id. at 473.
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rationality review and we uphold it as a species of economic
regulation."
Justice Souter, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Thomas, dissents, saying that, just as we said in Hurley, it
doesn't matter if you disagree with the point that's being made.3'
The point is that you have a right not to be compelled to speak.
Paying for speech is being compelled to speak indirectly. Therefore,
this violates the principle of protecting your conscience. Therefore,
they would have applied at least Central Hudson,32 an intermediate
scrutiny standard.
Four years later, the Court goes exactly the other way in United
States v. United Foods.33 Now the Court invalidates, under First
Amendment challenge, a compelled exaction to pay into a generic
advertising scheme for mushrooms. The mushroom-stone fruit
distinction being insufficient to explain the case, we have to ask:
what is? And, the difference here is that now the majority is Justice
Kennedy plus Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Scalia,
Souter, and Thomas. So, we have the dissenters from the stone fruit
case forming the majority here, picking up the votes of Justices
Kennedy and Stevens.
Now, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, says the
mushroom exactions are not going into a general scheme. The
Mushroom Council exists for the purpose of speaking and only for
speaking. We don't have Stalinism for mushrooms.34  For some
strange reason, we have competition for mushrooms except with
respect to speech, and therefore when we exact payments for
mushroom advertising, we are burdening the right to speak and only
the right to speak of those who pay into it, and there can't be any
defense of that. The mushrooms are not part of a larger marketing
scheme, and in the Court's words, the expression that the growers are
required to support is not germane to a purpose related to an
association independent from the speech issue. In other words, the
government can't set up an advertising agency and make you pay
into this. It can set up a larger marketing board that does a lot of
30. Id. at473 n.16.
31. Id. at 488-89.
32. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 567, 573 (1980).
33. United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2001).
34. Cf id. at 408 (describing the Mushroom Council's mission as an industry advocate).
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economic things and advertising can be a component, but it can't
single out your exaction for speech alone.
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and O'Connor dissent in United
Foods, holding that it's indistinguishable from Glickman, stating that
it's ludicrous to draw a general scheme versus a specific speech
scheme distinction, and suggesting that the requirement is good for
speech here.35 Justice Breyer expresses a kind of disagreement with
Justice Souter's autonomy principle.36 He says, I see the First
Amendment as about speech. This program expands speech, it
promotes speech, it gets speech out there. What's wrong with
getting speech out there? He again would say this is a far cry from
Barnette and Wooley. This is just a species of economic regulation.
Then, two terms ago, Johanns v. Livestock Marketing37 comes
down and it flips again. And, again, the Justices scatter like bowling
pins into a new array. This time the Court upholds against First
Amendment challenge the compelled exactions for the "Beef, it's
what's for dinner" campaign.38 This time, Justice Scalia, a dissenter
from the Glickman decision, writes for the Court, saying that this is a
compelled exaction for speech, but it's a compelled exaction for
speech as part of a broader marketing program-so, beef marketing
is more like stone fruit than like mushroom marketing with respect
to its relative degree of Stalinism. But the difference here is that,
when we say "Beef, it's what's for dinner," that's the government
speaking, and when the government speaks, there can be no First
Amendment offense that I have to pay into that ad campaign
because, just as I have to pay into general taxation, paying into spot
taxation in this instance will not associate me with the speech and it
will not violate my First Amendment rights.39 Everyone will know
that this is the government speaking, not the beef producers. There's
only one problem with that argument. By law, the signs are required
to be signed with a trademark paid for by America's Beef Producers.
But, Justice Scalia said, pay no attention to that label on the sign.4"
Everybody knows that that's really Secretary Johanns speaking.
35. Id. at419-20.
36. Id. at 422.
37. 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
38. Id. at 566-67.
39. Id. at 564 n.7.
40. Id. at 562-63.
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Secretary who? That's really the Secretary speaking because the law
requires him to supervise the board which is a mixed public/private
board. And, he's in effect drafting the speech. Now, this move by
Justice Scalia will remind you of the Rust v. Sullivan4' decision as
it's re-conceptualized in Rosenberge4 and Velazquez." In Rust, the
Court decided that it's okay to give money to family planning
organization on condition that they not counsel or encourage
abortion. On the first go around, Rust looks like a decision that
there's really no viewpoint discrimination involved. Later, Justice
Kennedy, writing for the Court in Velazquez, says: oh yes, there's
viewpoint discrimination involved in Rust, it's just that it was the
government speaking so that is permissible." Everyone knew that
when your doctor told you to go to this place and they'll allow you to
carry your pregnancy to term, it was really Surgeon General Koop
speaking, not your doctor. Same principle here in the beef case. We
know it's really the government speaking, and therefore there is no
First Amendment right against a compelled exaction.
There's a little aside here that maybe there could be an as-
applied challenge if one really could prove that the ads would be
attributed to the beef producer who has a right not to be associated
with the ad, but it was held that this was not proved on this record.
There was evidence on the record that the beef producer said, "I
don't really think this ad will be attributed to me."
Now, let's sum it up and then I'll turn it all over to Robert to
give some normative response to this. We have only four justices
who are consistent: Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and O'Connor would
uphold all three compelled exactions against First Amendment
challenge, reasoning that these regulations sound in Lochner v. New
York,45 they are a species of economic regulation, they are not
regulations of speech, and the fine distinctions between a general
program or speech-specific program, or between producer speech or
government speech, don't matter and don't distinguish the cases.
Justice Souter is the only justice who would consistently invalidate
all three programs, reasoning that the autonomy principle governs all
41. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
42. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
43. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
44. Id. at 541.
45. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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three alike. He quotes Thomas Jefferson saying it is tyrannical and
sinful to make a man pay to support a position with which he
disagrees. He's the only one who goes for autonomy all the way.
The other justices divide, with Justices Kennedy and Stevens
drawing the general program/speech-specific program distinction and
with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas
drawing the government speech/producer speech distinction. So,
you've got Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas all saying in effect, "oh,
my goodness, if we really take this seriously, everyone will have an
Abood right on April 15th to withhold portions of their taxes based
on their pro rata objection to listed government policies." They look
into that abyss and blink and say government speech is fine. It's fine
if your Stalinism is perfect. It's just not fine if your Stalinism goes
halfway there.
So, those are the cases. I think what we see now is that there's
at least a qualified right not to have compelled exactions to pay for
generic advertising campaigns mandated by the government. You'll
win more if you can show that the speech is the speech of the
producers or can be attributed to the producers, and less if the speech
is the speech of the government or that will be attributed to the
government.
WE1NSTEIN: Thanks, Kathleen. Isn't that a very pleasant way to have
digested for you about 812 pages of U.S. Reports? Very well done,
indeed. And now over to Robert for a commentary on Kathleen's
summary.
ROBERT C. POST: Kathleen did an amazing job summarizing these
very complicated cases. My role here is to ask what I generally ask
in panels on this subject-whether there is in fact a general right not
to be compelled to speak.
So, for example, if you receive a subpoena to testify in court,
does the subpoena pose a First Amendment problem? If you are
compelled to serve on a jury and to pronounce a verdict, does that
compulsion pose a First Amendment problem? If California enacts
legislation requiring motorists to report vehicle accidents, is the law
questionable under the First Amendment? If a state requires doctors
to report instances of child abuse or AIDS, is this requirement
constitutional under First Amendment?
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There are many, many, many analogous instances in which
speech is compelled, and in which no one perceives any First
Amendment issue to arise. This suggests to me that in the abstract
compelled speech is not a First Amendment issue. And if compelled
speech is not a First Amendment issue, it follows a fortiori that
compelled subsidization of speech is not a First Amendment issue.
This is because the only reason that compelled subsidization of
speech can possibly raise a constitutional question is that it may be
regarded as a form of compelled speech.
The intense conceptual problem posed by compelled
subsidization of speech is foregrounded in the Glickman4 trilogy of
cases-Glickman,47 United Foods,48 and Johanns.49  These cases
illustrate just how deeply the judiciary is staggering under the burden
of making sense of commercial speech doctrine. These cases turn on
the question of whether persons can be required to subsidize
commercial speech with which they happen to disagree. The Court
is completely lost in trying to understand this question. United
Foods essentially reverses Glickman, and Johanns essentially
reverses United Foods. The Court couldn't be more confused.
Taken together, the trilogy not only fails to provide guidance to
lower courts, but it reveals the most frightening internal theoretical
incoherence about why commercial speech should receive
constitutional protection and about what kind of protection it should
receive.
To begin with the Glickman case, Stevens's opinion offers three
distinct and inconsistent justifications for its conclusion." The
broadest justification is that the legislation is merely a species of
economic regulation with no First Amendment implications. Breyer
and Ginsberg, alone among the Justices, continue to advance this
rationale in United Foods and Johanns. The second justification is
that mandated speech is constitutional so long as the state compels
only speech that is not ideological. Because compelled commercial
speech is not ideological, it is constitutionally acceptable. The third
46. Glickman v. Weilman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997); United States v. United
Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
47. 521 U.S.457.
48. 533 U.S. 405.
49. 544 U.S. 550.
50. Glickman, 521 U.S. 457.
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justification is that government can compel speech if it is necessary
to do so to achieve a sufficiently important state objective. These
three inconsistent explanations are all compacted in the Glickman
opinion. It is very, very hard to discern what Glickman actually
means.
Four years after Glickman the Court reversed itself in United
Foods,5' which concerns compelled advertising for mushrooms.
Kennedy wrote United Foods in the broadest, most expansive
possible language. 2 He explicitly says that a person can never be
compelled to subsidize speech with which he disagrees. 3 But, as I
pointed out at the beginning of my remarks, this kind of abstract
generalization immediately runs into insuperable difficulties. Just to
give you a simple example, how is the Court going to deal with
statutes that compel parties to pay for their opponent's attorneys'
fees? Of course a person will disagree with their opponent's
attorneys, but does the First Amendment therefore prevent the state
from exacting attorneys' fees from losing parties? I don't think the
Court is likely so to hold. But the literal language of United Foods,
certainly implies this conclusion. 4
The real problem of United Foods, however, is taxes.5 Through
taxes we are every day forced to pay for the speech of government
officials with whom we disagree. Does it follow that such taxes are
constitutionally questionable? Or does it follow that taxes never
support government speech? The implications of United Foods, if its
broad language is taken literally, are flatly unacceptable.
Lower courts are supposed to obey the language of Supreme
Court opinions. So it should come as no surprise that in Livestock
Marketing Ass' v. Department ofAgriculture the Eighth Circuit held
that the First Amendment prevents taxpayers from being taxed to pay
for government speech with which they disagree. 6 And or course
once the Court realized the implications of its own broad dicta in
United Foods, it immediately realized that it had to intervene to
51. 533 U.S. 405.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 416 (holding that mandatory assessments by the Government which fund speech
with which a party disagrees "are not permitted under the First Amendment.").
54. Id. at 416 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
55. Id. at 425-26.
56. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 556-57 (2005).
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disown those implications. So it promptly granted certiorari and
reversed in Johanns, a decision authored by Scalia holding that
citizens can be forced to subsidize government speech."
The holding seems obviously correct, but what justifies it? Why
should forced subsidization of government speech not raise any First
Amendment issue, but forced subsidization of other speech raise a
First Amendment problem? Scalia makes the problem especially
puzzling because he emphasizes that a First Amendment problem
would be raised if persons were forced to subsidize speech that could
be attributed to them, even if such speech were government speech. 8
Thus Johanns specifically remands the case to determine if the
government speech in the case could be attributed to the beef
producers. If the government speech is so attributable, apparently a
First Amendment issue would arise.
This holding seems to put Johanns on a collision course with the
major precedent in the area, Wooley v. Maynard, 9 in which a
Jehovah's Witness named Maynard objected being forced to put on
his car a New Hampshire license plate that said "Live Free or Die."
The claim, which the Court upheld, was that the slogan on license
plate constituted compelled speech.6" Then Justice Rehnquist
dissented, asking whether the case involved any compelled speech at
all. Rehnquist argued, not unreasonably, that no one attributed the
slogan on the license plate to Maynard. The slogan was stamped on
the license plate by the state of New Hampshire and had nothing
whatever to do with Maynard's speech.61
In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Burger replied that the
license plate was analogous to a mobile billboard for the state's
message that Maynard was required to display. But of course being
forced to sustain a mobile billboard is different from being forced to
speak. It is more analogous to having your property drafted into the
service of the state. So on this account Wooley is about the
57. Id. at 562 ("Citizens may challenge compelled support of private speech, but have no
First Amendment right not to fund government speech.").
58. Id. at 567 n.11.
59. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
60. Id. at 717 ("[W]here the State's interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how
acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to avoid
becoming the courier for such message.")
61. Id. at 720 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The State has not forced appellees to 'say'
anything.").
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compelled subsidization of government speech.62 But in Johanns, as
we have seen, Scalia writes that persons can not under the First
Amendment object to being compelled to subsidize the state's speech
unless it is attributable to them.63 Either the state's slogan in Wooley
is or is not attributable to Maynard; either way the decision is
inconsistent with Johanns. And this conceptual instability just
scratches the surface, because Johanns does not even begin to
qualify the broad assertion of United Foods' that any compelled
subsidization of another's speech poses a First Amendment problem.
It is plain that this loose and unsustainable language is going to cause
trouble sometime in future.
Putting aside cases like attorneys' fees or juries or subpoenas, I
want to focus for a few moments on the problem this assertion will
cause in the specific context of commercial speech. All the early
commercial speech cases focused on an audience's right to hear
rather than on a speaker's right to express himself. Commercial
speech doctrine rests upon the importance of circulating information,
which necessarily implies that a speaker's right to say what she
wishes is constitutionally de-emphasized.
This implication lies at the core of one of Zauderer,65 one of
foundational commercial speech cases which holds that the state can
routinely compel disclosures in order to remedy potentially
misleading commercial speech. The holding of Zauderer is quite
significant. Government cannot compel someone to speak in public
discourse; it cannot say to the New York Times: "You are leaving out
relevant facts; your editorial is misleading and you had better
amplify it." The reason that the state can not compel public
discourse is that we care very much about the autonomy of speakers
within public discourse. But, thanks to Zauderer, almost all
consumer protection regulation rests on exactly the opposite
assumption about commercial speakers. We do not constitutionally
prize the autonomy of commercial speakers; we care about the
accuracy of the information that they circulate to the public. If the
state compels commercial speakers to divulge more information, the
62. Id. at 715.
63. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562.
64. United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 413 (2001).
65. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
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state increases the First Amendment value of commercial speech by
communicating more information to the public.
Zauderer created a regime that allowed government routinely to
mandate the disclosure of information in order to promote
transparent and efficient markets. Any economist will tell you that a
marketplace with more information is a more efficient market,
because information promotes accurate consumer choice. State
regulation compels disclosure not merely to prevent deception, but to
make markets more efficient. If you look at your clothes you are
now wearing, for example, you will find labels that say "Made in the
U.S." or "100% wool." These labels are mandated in order to
prevent deception, but to promote transparency and efficiency. A
similar rationale underlies the vast bulk of securities regulation.
The requirement of the disclosure of information to produce a
more efficient market is flatly contradictory to the assertion in United
Foods that commercial speakers possess a First Amendment interest
not to be forced to disclose accurate information. Johanns leaves
this assertion in place, which means that even after Johanns, if we
are to take the language of United Foods literally, the state can not
compel commercial speakers to disclose information in order to
pursue perfectly ordinary regulatory aims that lie at the foundation of
the administrative state's efforts to promote efficient and transparent
markets.
My diagnosis is that the Court in United Foods treats speech
abstractly; it assumes that the same rules apply to all speech. I
believe that this is flatly wrong. It is one thing to compel persons to
speak in the context of public discourse, and it is an entirely different
thing to compel persons to speak in the context of selling goods. The
Court fails to specify the exact constitutional values that are at stake
in different kinds of speech, and it tries to fashion a one-size-fits-all
doctrine. The result is a mess.
I just want to conclude by noting that there are two distinct lines
of cases that are at issue in United Foods. The first, which I've just
discussed, concerns compelled speech. The second, which I have not
so far mentioned and which is analytically distinct, concerns
compelled association. We have a First Amendment right to
associate, and therefore we also have a First Amendment right not to
associate. But, what is the First Amendment right of association? I
do not have a First Amendment right to associate in order to form a
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corporation. I do not have a First Amendment right to associate in
order to marry.
The First Amendment right of association has to be carefully
defined. It means that we have a First Amendment right to associate
together for the purpose of engaging in activities that the First
Amendment otherwise protects. I have a right to associate in order
to engage in the kind of speech that the First Amendment protects. It
follows that only those associations dedicated to the kind of speech
that is protected by the First Amendment can come within the
umbrella of the First Amendment right of association.
Persons have the right not to be compelled to join associations
that engage in First Amendment protected speech. This right is
analytically distinct from the right not to be forced to subsidize
ideological speech. This point was clarified in another Supreme
Court trilogy: Abood, 6 Ellis,67 and Lehnert.68 This line of cases
concerns compelled association with a union. Because unions
engage in First Amendment protected speech, persons can't be
forced to associate with unions except for a very good reason. The
Court uses what is known as the "germaneness" test to assess the
strength of the reasons that can sustain compelled association. The
germaneness test is analytically distinct from compelled speech. So,
for example, unless the requirement is "germane" to some very
important state interest, one can not be forced to associate with a
union even to the extent of being required to purchase a mandatory
union life insurance policy, even though compelling someone to
purchase a life insurance policy would not, by itself, trigger any First
Amendment scrutiny. This demonstrates that the right not to be
compelled to subsidize speech, and the right not to be compelled to
associate with an expressive association, are analytically distinct.
United Foods is a very ambiguous opinion. One possible
interpretation of the case is that the required contributions of the
mushroom growers constitutes impermissible coerced affiliation.
Insofar as United Foods is about coerced affiliation, however, it must
stand for the proposition that persons have the right not to be forced
to associate with an association that engages only in commercial
66. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
67. Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & Station
Employees, 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
68. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991).
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speech. But on this reading, United Foods implies that there is a
right to associate to engage in commercial speech. United Foods is
the first time that any such implication appears in the pages of the
United States Reports. Let us test the consequences of this
implication. Suppose I am affiliated with an advertising agency, a
group that engages only in commercial speech. Are the rules of who
may and may not be required to affiliate with the advertising agency
controlled by the First Amendment? Does the Constitution override
the usual laws of corporate governance or partnership? What could
that possibly mean? Such an absurd consequence would necessarily
follow from interpreting United Foods to stand for the proposition
that persons have a right to associate to engage in commercial
speech.
Analytically, therefore, there are two distinct problems that stem
from the Glickman, United Foods, Johanns line of cases. The first is
the question of coerced subsidization of speech, and in particular of
commercial speech; the second is the question of whether
commercial association counts as an expressive association for
purposes of the First Amendment.
WEINSTEIN: Thank you, Robert. Kathleen, would you care to
respond?
SULLIVAN: Okay, well, Robert has touched on so many points. It's
such a rich collection of ideas that I'll just try to intersect with a few
of them. Let me just start with the comparison to Zauderer.69 I think
what Robert has tried to suggest here is that we should be very
friendly to compelled speech in the commercial speech area, because
in this area, first of all, the First Amendment value at stake is the
flow of information. And, as Justice Breyer says consistently in all
his opinions in these cases, whether he's in the majority or the
dissent, if the value is the free flow of commercial information, then
pro-speech mandatory exactions are a good thing and you can't see
them as speech-inhibiting. I remember that, when Justice Breyer was
getting ready for his Senate confirmation hearings-we were
colleagues then-he kept saying that there are free speech interests
on both sides of all of these cases. And he sees himself oftentimes as
69. Zauderer, 471 U.S. 626.
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a regulator looking to balance those interests, as for example in
Bartnicki v. Vopper.70 And if there's a free speech-enhancing aspect
to the regulation, he'll see that not necessarily as a trump, but
certainly something to be weighed against the speech-restricting
value. So, first Robert suggests that compulsion is good because it's
speech-enhancing. That's the Breyer position.
But second, he does a sneaky thing. He says Zauderer is the
relevant case. Let's recall the facts of Zauderer. Zauderer
invalidates a number of limitations on lawyer speech, but it upholds
the requirement that if you're going to advertise that you will do
something on a contingency fee basis, you have to disclose whether
the contingency fee is being taken gross or net of costs and
expenses. 72 And, therefore, the client has a better understanding of
what the lawyer's actual, real percentage cut is going to be.73 In that
case, the disclosure was efficiency-enhancing and factual. 74  The
compelled disclosure in the compelled agricultural exaction line of
cases, however, is neither about facts, nor is it pro-efficiency. It's
not about facts because it's about the idea that all plums are good.
We're not forcing people to disclose the fact that plums can be
carcinogenic if eaten in certain quantities. In fact, the two skinniest
justices emphasize the extent to which the disclosure here is not
entirely factual. Justice Ginsburg is surely the skinniest justice,
narrowly edging out Justice Souter who only eats cottage cheese and
an apple for lunch and runs at night. The two skinniest justices, one
in concurrence and one in dissent in Glickman, write that the
government is speaking out of both sides of its mouth. It says,
"Beef, it's what for dinner," then in the dietary guidelines, it tells
you, "Don't eat too much animal fat, you should eat lots of grains
and legumes and vegetables and fruits." Justice Scalia says, oh, well,
there's no contradiction there. It's not saying, "Beef, it's what's for
breakfast, lunch, dinner and your midnight snack." So, what's at
70. 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (holding constitutionally protected a radio broadcast of an illegally
intercepted telephone conversation, but noting that such broadcast also inhibited speech that the
speakers intended to keep private).
71. Zauderer, 471 U.S. 626.
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stake in these cases is really not what's at stake in Zauderer or in
your SEC comparisons.
Go back to Seana Shiffrin's wonderful point in the colloquy
earlier about how this is not about forcing people to disclose
information over which they have asymmetrical access and that
might be of interest to people making informed consumer decisions.
It's really just not like that at all. It's, "all plums are good." In fact,
you could go one step further and say all of these forced advertising
schemes are counter to market efficiency because they prevent the
growers from engaging in product differentiation and price
discrimination by forcing them to advertise as if all plums are the
same. They're claiming that, on a limited advertising budget, they
shouldn't have to give in to this. It's a tough business with low
margins, so they don't have the budget to go out and do niche plum
advertising for their particular plums after they've spent money on
the compulsory generic plum ads. So, it's neither factual nor
efficient.
My last point on compulsion is that I think we should be very
careful about accepting that compulsion is okay in the commercial
speech area because of the different value we're serving than in other
areas. Compulsion can go too far and compulsion can be stupid and
excessive and it can actually be counter-productive and dry up
speech. I was involved, for example, in getting dismissed an S.E.C.
complaint seeking regulatory enforcement of Regulation FD (Fair
Disclosure),75 and there, both the economic and First Amendment
libertarian arguments converged: we argued successfully that, by
telling a corporate speaker that if he discloses any material non-
public information in a private gathering he has to file an 8K the next
minute disclosing it to the world, the regulation will not in fact level
the playing field by ensuring that the little guy will get all the
information the Goldman Sachs guys got at the dinner. It will simply
mean the corporate speaker will never again speak in any setting that
is private about anything whatsoever, and there will be less speech
rather than more. And, of course, there were twenty-two professors
of free speech who lined up against me-Steve Shiffrin was among
them saying that this was an idiotic argument from a First
75. 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-103 (2007); see S.E.C. v. Siebel Systems, Inc. 384 F. Supp. 2d
694 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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Amendment perspective. But we did win, and I do think that
economic considerations line up with speech considerations in these
cases to suggest that, at least sometimes, speech compulsion will
actually be counterproductive to the goal of more speech. So for
those reasons, I wouldn't so casually say that the compulsion here is
fine.
POST: I think Kathleen is absolutely right, which she always is, that
United Foods and Kennedy attempt to distinguish Zauderer by
asserting that the state interest Zauderer was preventing deception,
whereas in United Foods there was no issue of deception. But, if
you carefully examine Zauderer, the reasoning of the opinion does
not turn on the strength of the state's interest. In his opinion for the
Court in Zauderer, White stresses that rational basis review is
appropriate76 because commercial speech is protected in order to
safeguard the flow of information, and the regulation at issue
increases the circulation of information. It is true that White does
not entirely deny the autonomy interests of commercial speakers, but
he states explicitly that they are residual and minimal. If that is true,
then the state needs only a rational interests in order to overcome the
autonomy interests of commercial speakers. In United Foods, the
government's interest in support of its regulation was not deception,
but rather the promotion of mushroom marketing . That is a
perfectly ordinary rational interest of the administrative state. It is
certainly a powerful enough interest to overcome a merely residual
autonomy interest.
So the real question is how much of an autonomy interest do
commercial speakers retain. That's the crucial issue. How
powerfully do we want to protect the autonomy of commercial
speakers? And the greater the autonomy interest we attribute to
commercial speakers, the more difficult it will be to sustain the
perfectly pervasive and normal regimes of consumer protection that
now govern most markets.
SULLIVAN: I want to get in just one other response to Robert, then I'd
love to hear what Jim has to say and what you all have to say. The
second point on which I wanted to engage with Robert, in addition to
76. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
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the compulsion point, was that he suggests that the Souter school-
and the Souter school, let's face it, is just Souter if we look at all
three cases-the Souter school insofar as he picks up other votes
says autonomy is the governing principle here, and Robert raises
questions about whether autonomy can have much bite-he's not
saying it has none-but whether it can have much bite in this area
because, as Justice Stevens suggests, this is a far cry from Barnette.
Compelling speech in this area, it is true, is a far cry from the
ideological incursion involved in making a Jehovah's Witness
worship a graven image. But, let's give Souter a little bit of his due.
He's not just making an unbridled autonomy argument. He's making
a complicated political process argument: a kind of Carolene
Products footnote four argument about the reliability of political
processes.77 He's suggesting that, in the general taxation area, there
will be checks that prevent invidious burdens on unwilling speakers
because in the general taxation area it will all even out over time.
Regimes will change, we'll have divided government, the priorities
of government will change, and there won't be entrenched losers
who are imposed upon through the taxation scheme.
He says spot taxation is different, because when you have spot
taxation for a particular market group you don't have those political
checks, and therefore, we have to be more careful whether we're
invidiously burdening someone to say, "My plum's as good as his
plum," when you want to say, "My plum's better than his plum." To
some people, that's important. We go back to the theme yesterday
that it may be important to people to make commercial
differentiations. So, that's not an insensible argument. There's a
certain plausibility here. This is a spot taxation case. The question
you might raise is why is spot taxation any worse for speech than for
other regulatory claims? Isn't this just the thin, small voice of
Lochner raising its head under the cloak of the First Amendment
when in fact the objection is one that you might make to the taking
that's involved more generally? The objection is to the Stalinism,
not to the speech component of the Stalinism. That may be a
legitimate point. Those who are favorable to the more libertarian
view here think any small inroad you can make against Stalinism is a
good first step. But I do think it's legitimate to ask whether Souter
77. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)
LUNCHEON & DISCUSSION
has adequately tied his political process reasoning to the First
Amendment.
WEINSTEIN: It occurred to me as well that some of the opinions in
these cases evince a thinly veiled hostility towards the collectivist,
Roosevelt-era agricultural marketing orders under which some of
these advertising regulations were promulgated. It would really be
unfortunate if these Justices were using the First Amendment to
express hostility towards a type of economic arrangement with which
they disagree. I too have my doubts about the wisdom and fairness
of this type of regulation, particularly in this day and age, but this
just isn't a legitimate First Amendment concern. And not only in
these cases, but other areas of constitutional law as well, such as in
the recent punitive damage cases78 or on constitutional restrictions on
personal jurisdiction 9 there is a similar unacknowledged re-
emergence of restrictions on economic regulation. Maybe what's
happening is that the pendulum is finally beginning to swing back
slightly from the Court's total withdrawal from imposing due process
limitations on economic regulation that occurred as a reaction, or
arguably overreaction, to the abuses of the Lochner era. But even if
some degree of judicial oversight of economic legislation is
appropriate as a matter of substantive due process, it's very bad news
for this concern to be cropping up in First Amendment jurisprudence.
Not only is it illegitimate to use the First Amendment to vindicate
general liberty concerns such as these, not to mention simple
disagreement with economic policy, but doing so will also threaten
the coherence of free speech doctrine.
POST: In his dissent in Glickman, Justice Thomas actually refers to
Lochner with something like approval. He winks slyly and says that
courts may not be able to second-guess the rationality of economic
78. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); BMW ofN. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). Between the date of the live symposium and the publication of
this issue, the Supreme Court decided another case confirming the speaker's point, Philip Morris
USA v. Williams, 127 S.Ct. 1057 (2007).
79. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985). For a
discussion of the personal jurisdiction requirement as a species of substantive due process, see
James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications for
Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REv. 169, 231-32 (2004).
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regulation, but they can second-guess the rationality of regulations of
commercial speech.
In Johanns, Souter actually offers two distinct arguments for his
position. The first is that speakers cannot be forced to subsidize
government speech if the government is not democratically
accountable for its speech. Souter says that the there is no
democratic accountability for the beef advertisements at issue in
Johanns, so that Scalia's claimed exception for the subsidization of
government speech ought not to apply. I think Souter has a fair point
about whether the advertisements at issue in Johanns ought to be
considered government speech. But I don't understand how the
question of democratic accountability has anything to do with
protecting the autonomy of persons, which Souter explicitly claims is
the underlying constitutional value at issue in the case. I don't see
how the autonomy of persons is any less violated merely because
government speech is more democratically accountable.
The second argument that Souter makes is that supporting state
speech money with money derived from spot taxation is more galling
to the autonomy of persons than supporting state speech from funds
gathered from general taxes. To test this argument, we might
consider the regulatory regime that California uses for tobacco.
California imposes an excise tax on tobacco, and California uses the
funds created by this tax to pay for anti-smoking ads. The tobacco
companies sued, arguing that it was really galling to force them to
pay for anti-smoking advertisements. The question raised by
Souter's argument suggests that the constitutionality of California's
anti-smoking campaign depends upon the method that it uses to pay
for it.
Souter seeks to support his argument by citing Jefferson's point
that the State cannot force someone to pay for a church that preaches
a doctrine with which he disagrees. We do have in our constitutional
resources the idea that being forced to pay for a church or religious
doctrine might violate my conscience. But we have never made the
analogous point in regard to speech. If we accept the analogy to the
Establishment Clause, then all taxes to support government speech,
not merely spot taxes, are offensive to my autonomy. But Souter
argues that we ought to make a distinction between state speech
supported by spot taxes and state speech supported by the general
fund. I don't follow this argument. Why is one form of government
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speech any more offensive to autonomy than the other? Why should
the constitutionality of government speech turn on the government's
accounting system, on how it chooses to pay for its own speech?
[End of Discussion]
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